Automated Cryptographic Analysis of the Pedersen Commitment Scheme by Metere, Roberto & Dong, Changyu
ar
X
iv
:1
70
5.
05
89
7v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
6 M
ay
 20
17
Automated Cryptographic Analysis of the
Pedersen Commitment Scheme
Roberto Metere, Changyu Dong
Newcastle University (UK)
r.metere2@ncl.ac.uk, changyu.dong@ncl.ac.uk
Abstract. Aiming for strong security assurance, recently there has been
an increasing interest in formal verification of cryptographic construc-
tions. This paper presents a mechanised formal verification of the popu-
lar Pedersen commitment protocol, proving its security properties of cor-
rectness, perfect hiding, and computational binding. To formally verify
the protocol, we extended the theory of EasyCrypt, a framework which
allows for reasoning in the computational model, to support the discrete
logarithm and an abstraction of commitment protocols. Commitments
are building blocks of many cryptographic constructions, for example,
verifiable secret sharing, zero-knowledge proofs, and e-voting. Our work
paves the way for the verification of those more complex constructions.
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1 Introduction
The high and increasing volume of communication exchanged through insecure
channels, e.g. the Internet, confers increasing significance on security guarantees
of cryptographic protocols. However, the increasing complexity in the design of
cryptographic protocols leads to more complex and long proofs, making them
error-prone and difficult to check. In fact, it happened that protocols believed
to be secure, even for years, were found to be vulnerable to attacks after further
investigation [25, 2, 16, 34]. As a result, it is highly desirable to have tools that
can formally and automatically verify cryptographic protocols. Recently, many
tools have been developed based on different approaches for this purpose [27,
26, 22, 3, 9, 18]. They have been proven to be effective in verifying security
properties and finding attacks.
Most of the automatic tools aiming to aid proofs for cryptographic proto-
cols [24, 29, 15, 33, 36, 17, 6, 37, 20, 32, 28, 5, 34] work in the symbolic model,
some providing computational soundness for special cases [7], while only few sup-
port the computational model [14, 12, 11, 4]. The symbolic model [19] describes
the real world cryptographic protocols abstractly. Messages are literals, therefore
it is difficult to model partial leakage. Cryptographic primitives are assumed to
be perfect and used as black boxes, which is not realistic. The adversaries strate-
gies are often predefined and limited to the inference rules provided, therefore
the proofs are limited to case-by-case reasoning [8]. This overly simplistic way
can capture errors in the logic of the design, but cannot fully describe situa-
tions in which the cryptographic primitives cannot be treated as black boxes
and when the security properties are defined computationally, which is often
true in cryptographic protocols and other fields of cryptography. On the con-
trary, the computational model is more realistic when modelling cryptographic
protocols and can capture many low level details which are needed in proofs.
Cryptographic primitives are secure in the sense that computationally bounded
adversaries can break the security properties with only a negligible probability,
if certain assumptions hold. Messages are bit strings and adversaries can be any
polynomial time probabilistic Turing machine. Therefore, it allows for reason-
ing with probabilities and cryptographic assumptions. This allows for rigorous
proofs that cannot be obtained in the symbolic model.
In this paper we focus on proving properties of commitment schemes. Com-
mitment schemes are a cryptographic primitive that have been widely used by
its own or as a building block in other protocols, for example, verifiable secret
sharing, zero-knowledge proofs, and e-voting [30, 21, 35]. The high level concept
behind commitment protocol is intuitively simple, a committer wants to commit
to a message, while keeping it secret from a receiver until a later time when the
committer reveals the message to the receiver. In this paper we prove the secu-
rity properties of the popular Pedersen commitment scheme [31]. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first mechanised formalisation of this protocol.
Despite being a basic primitive in secure computation, to formalise it and
have a computer generated proof is far from trivial. In the security proof gen-
erated by humans, many small gaps are left by the prover as they are easy to
prove. However, for a machine the gaps can be huge and extra efforts need to be
spent to let the machine complete the proof. In particular, to prove the perfect
hiding property, we created a sequence of games that vary slightly to allow the
machine to carry on the proof. This additional construction is totally absent from
proofs in the original paper and textbooks. In addition, to prove computational
binding, we constructed a discrete logarithm game to allow for reduction.
The paper is organised as the following: in Section 2 we review the related
work. In Section 3, we introduce the preliminaries. We then describe the formal
proofs in relation to the constructions, in Section 4. In Section 5 we conclude
and discuss possible future work.
2 Related work
To avoid the limitations of symbolic model tools and capture all the proper-
ties of the cryptographic primitive, we used a tool allowing for reasoning in the
computational model. Some frameworks are available to work in such a model.
CryptoVerif [14] is based on concurrent probabilistic process calculus. Although
it is highly automatic, it is limited to prove properties related to secrecy and au-
thenticity. The tool gga∞ [4] specialises in reasoning in the generic group model
and seems promising when attackers have access to random oracles, which does
not apply to our setting. Certicrypt is a fully machine-checked language-based
framework built on top of the Coq proof assistant [12]. However it is no longer
maintained. EasyCrypt [11] follows the same approach as CertiCrypt and sup-
ports automated proofs as well as interactive proofs that allow for interleaving
both program verification and formalisation of mathematical theories. This is de-
sirable because they are intimately intertwined when formalising cryptographic
proofs, and can leave the tedious parts of proofs to machines.
Recently, a machine-checked formalisation of Σ-protocols to prove statements
about discrete logarithms has been developed in CertiCrypt [13]. A commonality
between the work in [13] and our work is that the Schnorr protocol proved in [13]
is also based on the discrete logarithm assumption.
3 Background
3.1 Commitment Protocols
Commitment protocols are two-party schemes between a committer C and a
receiver R, and run in two phases. Let M be the space of messages to commit
to. The first phase is called commitment phase, where the party C sends R its
commitment for a private message m ∈M and secretly holds an opening value.
The second phase is called verification phase, where the party C sends R the
original message m along with the opening value, so that R can verify that the
message committed in the first phase was indeed m.
Commitment protocols involve three efficient algorithms: (i) G (1n) which
outputs a public value h, (ii) C (h,m) which takes as input the public value h
and the message m, and outputs (c, d) where c is the commitment to send in the
first phase and d is the opening value to be send in the second phase, and (iii)
V (h,m, c, d) which takes as input the public value h, the messagem, the commit-
ment c and the opening value d, and outputs true if verification succeeds or false
otherwise. Let pi = (G, C,V) be a commitment scheme, its security properties
are (i) correctness, i.e. for every message the commitment generated is valid, (ii)
computational or perfect hiding, where any attacker cannot learn information
from the commitment c about the message m with any advantage (perfect), or
with a negligible advantage (computational), and (iii) computational or perfect
binding, where the message m is uniquely bound to c (perfect) or finding an-
other message with the same commitment has negligible probability of success
(computational). We defer the formal definitions of these properties to Section 4.
3.2 Reasoning in EasyCrypt
We present a brief overview of EasyCrypt. More information about Easycrypt
and the syntax of its language can be found in [10, 1]. Those who are familiar
with EasyCrypt can skip the rest of this section.
EasyCrypt handles the computational model, in which adversaries are prob-
abilistic algorithms. To capture this, we have modules that are containers of
global variables and procedures. Procedures capture the idea of algorithm, and
one can reason about procedures running in a memory (as an execution environ-
ment). In the computational model, one has to reason about the probability of
adversaries returning some specific results. EasyCrypt captures this idea as the
probability of running a procedure M.c in a memory m with post-condition Q
evaluating true, where M is the module containing the procedure c, written as
Pr[M.c(. . .) @ &m :Q]
To express and to prove properties, in EasyCrypt we use judgements (assertions)
in (i) basic higher-order logic for implemented theories, (ii) Hoare logic (HL),
(iii) probabilistic Hoare logic (pHL), and (iv) probabilistic relational Hoare logic
(pRHL). For the last three of them, there are concepts of pre-condition P and
post-condition Q, as well as proceduresM.c,M.c1, N.c2, . . . , inside modules M ,
N , running in some memory m.
HL hoare[M.c :P ⇒ Q] - When P is true relating to some memory m and M.c
terminates in m, then after running M.c, Q always evaluates to true in the
(modified) memory.
pHL phoare [M.c :P ⇒ Q] < r - When P is true relating to some memory
m and M.c terminates in m, then after running M.c, Q evaluates to true
in the (modified) memory with probability less than r ∈ [0, 1] ⊂ R. Other
supported relations are the common relations =, >, ≥, and ≤.
pRHL equiv[M.c1 ∼ N.c2 :P ⇒ Q] - When P is true relating to some memory
m and M.c1 and N.c2 terminate in m, then after running them in two sepa-
rate copies of m, Q always evaluates to true in the corresponding memories.
In cryptography, security is usually defined by requiring certain properties to
hold for all adversaries. To capture the for all quantifier, in EasyCrypt, adver-
saries are defined with abstract procedures, which means the adversaries can do
anything without any prescribed strategies. Working with abstract procedures
may require to assume their termination. In Easycrypt, the idea of termination is
modelled by the keyword islossless. We can declare a procedure to be lossless
using the following syntax:
islossless M.c
The statement is defined as a pHL judgement phoare[M.c : T⇒ T] = 1%r, which
means the procedure M.c always returns and terminates with a probability 1 (1%r
means real number 1).
All the above constructions are useful for our formalised proof. In particular,
to prove the correctness we used a HL judgement, to prove perfect hiding we
used both pRHL to compare the hiding experiment with an artificial experiment
and a pHL to finalise the proof, and to prove computational binding we used
a pHL judgement to compare the binding experiment to the discrete logarithm
experiment.
4 Formal Verification of Pedersen Commitment Scheme
In this section we show how we modelled the generic commitment scheme and its
security properties, the Pedersen commitment scheme and we proved its security
properties of correctness, perfect hiding and computational binding.
4.1 Modelling the Scheme
The abstract commitment scheme is modelled by the following few lines, proto-
typing the algorithms introduced in Section 3.1:
module type CScheme = { (* Abstract commitment scheme *)
pro gen() : value
pro commit(h: value, m: message) : commitment * openingkey
pro verify(h: value, m: message, c: commitment, d: openingkey) : bool
}.
The Pedersen commitment protocol runs between a committer C, holding a
secret message m ∈ Zq to commit to, and a receiver R who agrees on the group
(G, q, g), where q is the order of G and g is its generator, and is defined as the
following:
Commitment phase
– R samples a value h ∈R G and sends h to C.
– C samples an opening value d ∈R Zq, computes the commitment c =
gdhm, and sends c to R.
Verification phase
– C sends the pair (m, d) to R.
– R checks whether gdhm matches to the previously received commitment
c, and either accepts if they match or reject if the do not.
We model the protocol in EasyCrypt as the following:
module Ped : CScheme = { (* Implements a CScheme *)
pro gen() : value = {
var x, h;
x =$ FDistr.dt; (* This randomly samples an element in the field Z_q *)
h = g^x; (* g is globally defined from the cyclic group theory *)
return h;
}
pro commit(h: value, m: message) : commitment * openingkey = {
var c, d;
d =$ FDistr.dt;
c = (g^d) * (h^m);
return (c, d);
}
pro verify(h: value, m: message, c: commitment, d: openingkey) : bool = {
var c';
c' = (g^d) * (h^m);
return (c = c');
}
}.
4.2 Formalising security properties
The security properties we want to prove are correctness, hiding and binding.
The properties are captured by experiments, which are formally defined below
and modelled as in Fig. 1.
Definition 1 (Correctness). A commitment protocol pi defined by the triplet
(G, C,V) is correct if for all messages m ∈ M to commit, let h = G (1n) and
(c, d) = C (h,m), then V (h,m, c, d) = 1.
Loosely speaking, the verification done by the algorithm V of any message m
committed using the algorithm C will always succeed.
For hiding and binding, we have two different adversaries: (i) the unhider
U , which plays the hiding experiment and has two abstract procedures, one
to choose a pair of messages, and another to guess which of the two messages
corresponds to a given commitment; (ii) the binder B, which plays the binding
experiment and has only a procedure to output two different pairs (message,
opening value) that bind to the same commitment.
Definition 2 (Hiding). Let pi = (G, C,V) be a commitment protocol. Then we
can define the hiding properties for each polynomial time adversary U .
(perfect hiding) Pr
[
HExpU ,pi (n) = 1
]
=
1
2
(computational hiding) ∃µ (n) . Pr
[
HExpU ,pi (n) = 1
]
≤
1
2
+ µ (n)
where µ (n) is a negligible function.
Hiding experiment. The hiding experiment HExpU ,pi runs as follows:
– The adversary is given the output of G and asked to choose two messages,
– the experiment randomly selects one of them and calls C to compute its
commitment,
– the adversary is asked to guess which one of the two messages the commit-
ment corresponds to, and finally
– the experiments outputs 1 if the guess of the adversary is correct.
A commitment protocol satisfies the hiding security property if no adversary
exist such that the probability of winning the hiding experiment is (significantly)
better than a blind guess. If this is true, the committer is guaranteed that no
information can be inferred by the commitment itself.
Definition 3 (Binding). Let pi = (G, C,V) be a commitment protocol. Then we
can define the binding properties for each polynomial time adversary B.
(perfect binding) ∃µ (n) . Pr
[
BExpB,pi (n) = 1
]
= 0
(computational binding) ∃µ (n) . Pr
[
BExpB,pi (n) = 1
]
≤ µ (n)
where µ (n) is a negligible function.
Binding experiment. The binding experiment BExpB,pi runs as follows:
– The adversary is given the output of G and asked to bind two messages to
the same commitment value, then
– the experiment outputs 1 if the two messages differ and the commitment is
valid for both the messages, that is if both can be verified by calling V .
A commitment protocol satisfies the binding security property if no adversary
exist such that the probability of winning the binding experiment is higher than
negligible. If this is true, the receiver is guaranteed that the value committed
cannot be changed.
Fig. 1. Commitment scheme properties. Correctness (top), hiding experiment (left)
and binding experiment (right) modelled in EasyCrypt.
module Corr (S:CScheme) = {
pro main(m: message) : bool = {
var h, c, d, b;
h = S.gen();
(c, d) = S.commit(h, m);
b = S.verify(h, m, c, d);
return b;
}
}.
module HExp(S:CScheme,U:Unhider) = {
pro main() : bool = {
var b, b', m0, m1, h, c, d;
h = S.gen();
(m0, m1) = U.choose(h);
b =$ {0,1};
(c, d) = S.commit(h, b?m1:m0);
b' = U.guess(c);
return (b = b');
}
}.
module BExp(S:CScheme,B:Binder) = {
pro main() : bool = {
var h, c, m, m', d, d', v, v';
h = S.gen();
(c, m, d, m', d') = B.bind(h);
v = S.verify(h, m , c, d );
v' = S.verify(h, m', c, d');
return v /\ v' /\ (m <> m');
}
}.
4.3 Proofs
Relating to the properties modelled in Section 4.1, the Pedersen commitment
scheme security properties we have to prove are correctness, perfect hiding, and
computational binding. These security properties rely on the existence of a group
(G, q, g) in which the discrete logarithm is hard to compute (discrete logarithm
assumption).
Correctness. Correctness in EasyCrypt is formalised with a HL judgement:
hoare[ Corr(Ped).main : T⇒ res]. Its proof is straightforward. The first step
is to unfolding the definition of Corr(Ped).main, which is the correctness algo-
rithm described in Fig. 1 instantiated with Ped illustrated in Section 4.1. Then
we have c = gdhm and c′ = gdhm which are always equal.
Perfect hiding. In the Pedersen protocol we prove the perfect hiding:
∀U . Pr
[
HExpU ,Ped (G, q, g) = 1
]
=
1
2
(1)
In EasyCrypt, we modelled it with the following lemma:
lemma perfect_hiding: forall (U <: Unhider) &m,
islossless U.choose ⇒ islossless U.guess ⇒
Pr[HExp(Ped, U).main() @ &m : res] = 1%r / 2%r.
Where U <: Unhider is the adversary U with abstract procedures choose and
guess, of which we needed to assume they terminate islossless U.choose and
islossless U.guess.
Perfect hiding can be proved by comparing the hiding experiment to an inter-
mediate experiment in which the commitment is replaced by gd which contains
no information about mb. The experiment is described in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. The intermediate hiding experiment is almost equal to the hiding experiment,
but the commitment is replaced by a random group element.
HInterm U, Ped (G, q, g)
h ∈R G;
(m0,m1)← U .choose (h);
b ∈R {0, 1};
d ∈R Zq;
c← gd; // message independent
b′ ← U .guess (c);
return b = b′;
module HInterm(U:Unhider) = {
pro main() : bool = {
var b, b', x, h, c, d, m0, m1;
x =$ FDistr.dt;
h = g^x;
(m0, m1) = U.choose(h);
b =$ {0,1};
d =$ FDistr.dt;
c = g^d; (* message independent *)
b' = U.guess(c);
return (b = b');
}
}.
We prove it by first showing that for all adversaries, the probability of win-
ning the hiding experiment is exactly the same as winning the intermediate
experiment.
∀U . Pr
[
HExpU ,Ped (G, q, g) = 1
]
= Pr [HIntermU ,Ped (G, q, g) = 1]
In code,
lemma phi_hinterm (U<:Unhider) &m:
Pr[HExp(Ped,U).main() @ &m : res] = Pr[HInterm(U).main() @ &m : res].
To prove that, we unfold the two experiments in a pRHL judgement. The first
experiment is automatically instantiated by EasyCrypt as follows:
HExp U , Ped (G, q, g)
h ∈R G;
(m0,m1)← U .choose (h);
b ∈R {0, 1};
d ∈R Zq;
c← gdhmb ;
b′ ← U .guess (c);
return b = b′;
The proof is done by comparing the execution of the two experiments and is
based on the fact that the distribution of hmbgd is taken over gd.
Then, we proved that for all adversaries, the probability of winning the in-
termediate experiment is exactly a half.
∀U . Pr [HIntermU ,Ped (G, q, g) = 1] =
1
2
In EasyCrypt, we have:
lemma hinterm_half (U<:Unhider) &m:
islossless U.choose ⇒ islossless U.guess ⇒
Pr[HInterm(U).main() @ &m : res] = 1%r/2%r.
Combining the two lemmas, by transitivity, we prove perfect hiding for Pedersen
commitment protocol as in equation (1).
Computational binding. For the Pedersen protocol, we prove the compu-
tational binding property.
∀B. ∃µ (n) . Pr
[
BExpB,Ped (G, q, g) = 1
]
≤ µ (n) (2)
where µ (n) is a negligible function. The proof is done by a reduction to the dis-
crete logarithm assumption. In cryptography, proof by reduction usually means
to show how to transform an efficient adversary that is able to break the con-
struction into an algorithm that efficiently solves a problem that is assumed to
be hard. In this proof, the problem assumed to be hard is the discrete logarithm
problem [23, p. 320]. We show that if an adversary can break the binding prop-
erty, then it can output (m, d) and (m′, d′) such that gdhm = gd
′
hm
′
. If this is
true then the discrete logarithm of h = gx can be computed by
x =
d− d′
m′ −m
.
Fig. 3. The discrete logarithm experiment (left) and an adversary reducing the binding
experiment with the Pedersen protocol to the discrete logarithm experiment (right),
where DLogAttacker(B).guess models A (B).guess.
DLog A (G, q, g)
x ∈R Zq;
x′ ← A.guess (gx);
if x′ = ⊥ then
b← false;
else
b← (x′ = x);
return b;
A (B) .guess(h)
(c,m, d,m′, d′)← B.bind (h);
if c = gdhm = gd
′
hm
′
∧m 6= m′ then
x←
d− d′
m′ −m
;
else
x← ⊥;
return x;
module DLog(A:Adversary) = {
pro main () : bool = {
var x, x', b;
x =$ FDistr.dt;
x' = A.guess(g^x);
if (x' = None)
b = false;
else
b = (x'= Some x);
return b;
}
}.
module DLogAttacker(B:Binder) : Adversary = {
pro guess(h: group) : F.t option = {
var x, c, m, m', d, d';
(c, m, d, m', d') = B.bind(h);
if ((c = g^d * h^m) /\
(c = g^d' * h^m') /\ (m <> m'))
x = Some((d - d') * inv (m' - m));
else
x = None;
return x;
}
}.
We capture the reduction by two modules in EasyCrypt (Fig. 3). A small
technical subtlety is that since the adversary is abstractly defined, it can return
m = m′ with some probability. This can cause division by zero. Therefore, we
check the output from the adversary to avoid it. Formally, the adversary assumed
to break the binding experiment is B and we construct an adversary A to break
the discrete logarithm experiment with equal probability of success:
∀B. Pr
[
BExpB,Ped (G, q, g) = 1
]
= Pr
[
DLogA(B) (G, q, g) = 1
]
The above is captured in EasyCrypt by the lemma:
lemma computational_binding: forall (B <: Binder) &m,
Pr[BExp(Ped, B).main() @ &m : res] =
Pr[DLog(DLogAttacker(B)).main() @ &m : res].
To prove the lemma, we unfolded the experiments as much as possible, i.e. up
to abstractions, in a pRHL judgement which created an equivalence of the two
experiments in the sense illustrated in Section 3.2. The binding experiment is
automatically unfolded to the following.
BExp B, Ped (G, q, g)
h ∈R G;
(c,m, d,m′, d′)← B.bind (h);
v ← c = gdhm
v′ ← c = gd
′
hm
′
return v ∧ v′ ∧m 6= m′;
The automatic tactics could not automatically prove the lemma, as the ex-
pression (d− d′) / (m′ −m) used by the attacker A (modelled as DLogAttacker)
in the DLog experiment was too complex to be automatically used by the prover
into the binding experiments and needed to be manually guided.
Assuming that the discrete logarithm is hard, then the probability of the
experiment BExpB,Ped (G, q, g) returning 1 must be negligible. Finally,
∀B. ∃µ (n) . Pr
[
BExpB,Ped (G, q, g) = 1
]
≤ µ (n)
which is the definition of computational binding we gave in equation (2).
5 Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we showed how EasyCrypt can be used for formally verifying
practical cryptographic primitives and automatising mechanised proofs. With a
game based approach, we could construct fully mechanised proofs of the security
properties of the Pedersen commitment protocol, a building block primitive for
many cryptographic protocols.
Composability is a desirable property of cryptographic protocols. When de-
signing a protocol, we often want to guarantee that the composition of the pro-
tocol does not break the required security properties. In cryptography, advanced
theories like Universal Composability have been proposed. As a future work, we
will investigate how to enable machine-aided proofs for composability.
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